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The Efficiency in Welfare Expenditure and Economic Growth
Kyoungdon Park*
Abstract: This paper analyzes the various arguments that support or oppose
expansion in social welfare spending. A critical concern is the fear that as welfare
expenditure increases, at some point, economic development will decrease.
However, increased welfare investment is essential for achieving a welfare state
to ensure the optimal growth of the economy and social welfare. OECD (Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries with a particular
welfare regime that efficiently invests welfare spending are regarded as a reference
for Korea. In consideration of the environmental factors in each nation, the relative
efficiency level of welfare spending is calculated with panel data. It is evident
that Korea’s investment in social welfare from 2003 to 2007 was inefficient.
One way to achieve an appropriate balance between social welfare and economic
growth is to lessen the inefficiency of welfare investment.
Keywords: inefficient welfare investment, Window Analysis, environmental
variables, Stable Economic Growth model, Efficient Social Welfare model
INTRODUCTION
Critics of welfare state building argue that it is the main obstacle to national devel-
opment and stable economic growth—that is, that rising social welfare investment may
contribute to a decrease in the nation’s economic growth (Atkinson, 1999). Building a
Western-style welfare state is not always guaranteed to lead to continuous economic
development in the form of higher GDP rate, larger societal utility, or, even better, a
permanently growing country. It is apparent that the main barriers to investing in higher
welfare spending may result from the negative perspective that an increase in welfare
Manuscript received November 4, 2011; out for review November 8, 2011; review completed
December 5, 2011; accepted December 14, 2011.
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2011), pp. 129-146.
© 2011 by the GSPA, Seoul National University
* Kyoungdon Park is a professor of public administration at Chung-Ju National University. He
was a director of the Department of Public Policy Service in the Korea Institute of Public
Administration. He holds a PhD in public administration and policy from the State University
of New York at Albany. His research interests include quantitative policy analysis, health
care policy, and Medicaid and long-term care insurance. E-mail: pkdon0525@cjnu.ac.kr.
programs’ size and revenue may decrease economic growth. In spite of this skepticism,
there has been little research of ever-reaching agreements on the link between economic
growth and welfare spending.
This paper explores the welfare-growth efficiency of member nations of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Currently, welfare state
building is a controversial subject in Korea due to its uncertainty and impossibility
toward nation growth. Potential problems related to welfare investment could be the
situation that country economy is a rapid expansion in the amount of spending might
not assure the goal attainment of social welfare. Since Korea has not yet become a
complete welfare state, a review of OECD member nations’ experiences with invest-
ment in the welfare sector could suggest potential implications for Korea. While the
Korean people understand that the construction and implementation of strengthened
social protection is important and even urgent, they have reached no clear consensus
on the current and future level of social welfare investment (Caruana, 2010).
Conventionally, developing countries or nearly advanced countries often tend to
emphasize the “catching-up model” (Aiginger & Guger, 2006), which involves inten-
sive investment in social welfare relative to comprehensive services. Accepting the
model causes complex problems, which create controversy about the proper size of
welfare investment and economic investment. Inherently, a highly developed welfare
state is intended to correct market failures and the negative consequences of the
unequal distribution of wealth. Over time, developing countries with increasing welfare
expenditures have become skeptical about whether to invest further. They are concerned
that such investments in welfare may yield conflicts between welfare and economic
growth. To some degree, every OECD country has a selected share of welfare invest-
ment against GDP to facilitate wealth redistribution and social justice.
Given these concerns about the proper level of welfare spending, this paper tries to
answer two questions: What countries have proved most efficient in improving social
welfare and economic growth within its country-specific environment? And what
country has found the optimum welfare regime to provide an efficient foundation for
balancing social welfare and economic growth?
LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY MODEL
Relationships between Social Welfare and Economic Growth
Research on social welfare and growth can be divided into two categories. One
group focuses on the positive or negative relationships between social welfare and
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economic growth, and the other investigates efficiency in welfare sub-areas. First,
many literatures analyze the efficiency of welfare spending, relative to the national
economy, that invests in various social goods such as education, family destruction,
and child welfare, in a context of scare resources. Previous research has found three
strong arguments of welfare expenditures for and against nation growth. The empirical
results of these studies have been quite diverse.
Whether economic growth is positively affected by welfare investment is a very
controversial issue. Scholars addressing it could be divided into three groups. First, a
variety of papers make an empirical analysis of the positive outcomes of welfare
investment by applying a classic economic model to workforce increase and produc-
tivity (Atkinson, 1999; Brooks & Manza, 2006; McCallum & Blais, 1987; McDonald
& Miller, 2009). Their general focus is on welfare subsystems such as poverty allevia-
tion, employment, and workforce development.
Second, other scholars (Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Weede, 1991) argue that welfare
state expenditure hinders national economic growth. The extent to which different
social and governmental conditions obstruct a nation’s development varies from
nation to nation. Among many reasons that could explain the undesirable results of
welfare investment, governmental spending decisions in a particular welfare area is a
very prominent one (Rahn & Fox, 1996).
The welfare state is widely regarded as one of the factors accountable for lower
economic growth (Lindbeck, Molander, Petersson, Sandmo, et al., 1993). Bergh (2006)
argues that, given the complex and uncertain issue of “welfare state over-sizing”
(Caruana, 2010, p. 77), a high level of social welfare and protection could prevent a
national economy from improving. A lower rate of economic growth (Caruana, 2010),
a decrease in total productivity (Baumol, 1984), political degradation (Ghate & Zak,
2002), a higher rate of tax (Atkinson & Werner-Sinn, 1999), and an unstable labor
market (Hemerijck & Eichhorst, 2009) can slow economic growth.
Third, others (Wolfe, 1931) argue that there is no direct link between economic
growth and welfare expenditure. Some researchers assert that the argument that the
relationship between welfare investment and national economic growth is harmful to
welfare growth is unclear (Hansson & Henrekson, 1994; Landau, 1985). They state
that the economic consequences of welfare spending are either positive or negative.
The effects of welfare investment on the national economy are not unidirectional
(Atkinson, 1995). The ramifications of welfare spending are different both in the con-
ditions for the growth structure of a nation (Fic & Ghate, 2004) and in the balance
between socioeconomic change and social protection (Aidukaite, 2011).
In a separate body of literature, much research selects and studies a particular social
field or functional area that is most conducive to increased welfare, and therefore
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growth balance. Many scholars (Afonso, Schuknecht & Tanzi, 2003; Gupta & Verhoeven,
2001) have studied the efficiency of national education systems. Afonso et al. (2003)
analyze the degree of educational efficiency by applying the public expenditure in 25
OECD countries to educational performance indicators. They find that inefficient
countries could enhance their efficiency if they reinvest their resources (Afonso et al.,
2003).
By re-employing Gouyette and Pestieau’s (1999) method, Ravallion (2003) con-
ducted an empirical study to test the relative efficiency of social spending and poverty
reduction, and found that the cost savings resulting from actual efficiency improve-
ment were huge: an average of 8.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
There are some limitations in the previous studies. While a growing number of
studies analyze the specific effects of welfare investment, the general effects of welfare
spending on economic performance could not be firmly established (Beraldo, Montolio,
& Turati, 2005). Previous studies have been relatively successful in isolating specific
elements or subsystems of welfare investment that have an impact on economic per-
formance, but the overall impact of welfare spending in a country is still only vaguely
understood.
One solution to the measurement issues raised above is to incorporate the criticism
into an empirical research design for international efficiency comparison, which can
help to find the relative strengths of overall welfare investment in fostering national
growth. The existing literature does not provide a comprehensive answer for a nation
considering whether it should maintain or expand its welfare system in the face of
slow economic growth and of concerns that welfare investment may adversely affect
economic growth.
Another limitation of earlier studies is that the practical issues for national per-
formance under a productivity-based welfare initiative and reform have not been
adequately assessed as a product of a country’s policy decisions. In many cases, the
public share of welfare expenditure as a rate of GDP is higher than that of private
expenditure. From this perspective, it is very important to note that governmental
function has been upheld in every economic term as being a critical factor in the decision
to increase welfare investments. The rationale behind this argument is rooted in the
governmental role of the welfare state.
In light of the above argument, this study is based on the assumption that public
and private investment coexist in various welfare areas, while government has the
more substantial role. Governments strategically responded to economic growth both
by redirecting resources among the sub-areas of the welfare system and by incorporat-
ing more or fewer resources into a particular sub-area and activity. Governmental
spending patterns and welfare investment portfolios are very diverse. When a nation is
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convinced that higher welfare investment and higher economic performance will be
attained simultaneously, the inefficiency problem of welfare spending at the country
level could be adequately solved. Therefore, governmental accountability for decision-
making in social welfare investment and the resultant overall level of investment need
to be modeled in the empirical research design for international comparison.
Theoretical Model
Until now, no country could be certain that its further investment in welfare will
lead to economic and welfare improvement. To answer the question of the proper mix
of welfare spending and investment in economic growth, this study developed two
empirical solution models for comparison: the Stable Economic Growth (SEG) and
Efficient Social Welfare (ESW) models. A key rationale for using the two models is
that welfare investment affects both economic efficiency and social welfare.
To assist industrialized countries to meet economic growth goals, a higher level of
welfare investment is the most necessary one, which requires OECD nations to imple-
ment the most effective policy for improving economic development indicators such
as GDP. First, the SEG model was designed to test if a nation could achieve welfare
spending reduction while keeping economic outcomes as high as possible for a long
period. OECD nations have experienced highly diverse welfare input levels in terms
of spending, intuition, and benefit levels for accomplishing sustained economic
growth.
The SEG model is based on the concept that economic development is facilitated
by properly investing welfare resources in the country’s growth. Developed nations
with high welfare costs for pursuing greater growth are likely to spend more money
and to give the resultant higher burden to the national growth. If this situation goes on
over a long period, even rich countries with high costs may be motivated to economize
welfare inputs to boost economic development. Therefore, the SEG model hypotheti-
cally seems to fit the situation in which a country tries to achieve relative efficiency in
welfare investment for the purpose of a stable and continuous rise in economic
growth.
The ESW model was separately developed to test the notion that continuous welfare
growth caused by rising welfare and economic expenditure might lead to a higher
level of welfare institutions and outcomes. In reality, it is not clear that governmental
decision-making on the level of welfare and economic investment will actually promote
social welfare in a country. If there are inefficiencies in creation of welfare institutions,
investment in social welfare should be lessened. The ESW model tries to provide a
new solution for the unsettled perspectives of economic growth efficiency.
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Because no empirical study has attempted to solve these two questions at the country
level, this study used these two approaches to attempt to predict the relative efficiency
of use of national resources. Given the complexity and uncertainty involved in choos-
ing the proper mix of allocations to welfare and economic resources, there might be
potential trade-offs between the objectives of economic growth and welfare expansion.
The concerns about interaction between welfare spending and economic growth could
be adequately answered if the OECD nations’ rational decision-making regarding
welfare investment and the appropriate social benefits for the public are combined in
the most efficient way.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Analytical Framework
The purpose of this study is to identify and test the relationships between economic
development and welfare investment. Its focus is on international comparison while
adequately taking into consideration country-specific environments for welfare and
growth. The empirical testing procedure has three stages.
In the first stage, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with a technique of window
analysis is employed in estimating relative efficiency for the sample OECD member
countries. This stage aims at identifying stable growth mechanisms with regard to the
ESW and SEG models. In the second stage, the Tobit panel regression model with the
censored dependent variable of DEA scores for each sample is used to estimate relative
efficiency and to calculate adjusted inefficiency. In the third stage, Cluster Analysis of
the relative efficiency scores is used both to provide further evidence that a gap in
welfare spending between Korea and other advanced countries may exist and to iden-
tify the international variation in efficient investment in welfare growth and economic
growth.
The DEA approach developed by Farrell (1957) is very relevant to testing the rest
OECD countries as well as Korea. There should be an opportunity to find an efficiency
level to better fit the current welfare investment and refine the welfare initiatives so
that long-term versus short-term ramifications are considered. The DEA approach is
suitable to assess the relative efficiency of decision-making units, or OECD member
countries, when they try to integrate the two seemingly conflicting national goals of
social welfare growth and economic growth. This approach assumes that a member
country can set an overall expenditure limit on welfare spending and design a welfare-
spending-based institution that gives more flexibility and higher satisfaction to its
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people. Whether the country as a decision-making unit utilizes public money above
the average level of welfare spending and tries to find the least expensive means of
satisfying its population is examined.
Scholars of social welfare and economics have long suspected that a country’s
welfare investment type leads to growth in both the national economy and welfare
benefits. Theoretically, it is suspected that different types of welfare state (Esping-
Andersen, 1990) - Liberalized, Conservative-Corporative, or Social Democratic - have
significantly different effects on welfare productivity. However, nowadays welfare
spending efficiency instead of welfare state type is becoming the focus in establishing
the form of a national welfare system. Thus, Cluster Analysis of social welfare and
national growth could provide an answer regarding which regime of welfare spending
is more efficient.
Data and Variables
Data for empirical testing in this study were collected from various secondary
information sources such as OECD revenue statistics, social security programs
throughout the world, UNDESA, the World Bank, the IMF, and Freedom House. Data
from Australia, Chile, and Estonia were eliminated, since these countries do not provide
the information needed to test the study models. This analysis covered 87 OECD
member countries for the period from 2003 to 2007.
Since the research model uses Ray’s (1991) three-step procedure, two sets of vari-
ables are needed: input and output variables and dependent and independent variables.
Variables for DEA are classified into two categories at the OECD country level:
discretionary input and nondiscretionary variable or environmental variable.
In the first step of analysis, the DEA-window model to examine welfare expenditure
is constructed with 11 variables that are the components of governmental decision-
making. Mainly, data from OECD revenue statistics reports from 2003, 2005, and
2007 are used as the output variable. GDP is used for the SEG model, while reverse
unemployment rate,1 life expectancy, and the Welfare Institution Generosity Index2
are used for the ESW model. GDP as an output variable in the SEG model should
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1. A high efficiency in DEA analysis is achieved by maximizing higher levels of outputs with
lower levels of inputs in production. Since the unadjusted unemployment rate wrongly
shows that a higher unemployment rate is desirable for better outputs for the ESW, I use
the reverse score.
2. Readers interested in a complete explanation of the Welfare Institution Generosity Index
are invited to e-mail the author.
capture investment efficiency in social welfare. In contrast, the three welfare outputs
in the ESW model are expected to detain investment efficiency in economic develop-
ment. All the inputs and outputs used in the DEA-window analysis are discretionary
variables controllable by the decision-making unit, an OECD country (see table 1).
In the second step, Tobit panel regression is used to purge the environmental
effects to the output in the two models. The five nondiscretionary variables-Human
Development Index (HDI) score, total population, proportion of the population aged
65 or older, dependency rate, and Political Index score are used as independent variables
for new efficiency estimations in the regression. In the last step, Cluster Analysis is
employed to classify inefficiency increase and decrease in growth and social welfare.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for OECD Countries (n = 87)
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Output
For SEG model: GDP (in billion US dollars) 1,165.9 2,345.3
For ESW model: reverse unemployment rate (%) 93.4 3.4
For ESW model: expectancy (years) 81.6 2.0
For ESW model: Welfare Institution Generosity Index score (%) 0.66 0.08
Discretionary input (in millions)
Governmental share of medical expenditure 2,216,929.1 7,710,996.3
Spending on social investment 218.0 390.3
Spending on education 58.2 124.6
Workforce in social welfare 1,592,576 3,185,134
Governmental contribution to social security 113.3 189.5
Social transfer by governments 254.4 452.5
Tax burden 351.6 633.5
Environmental variable
Human Development Index score (%) 0.845 0.045
Total population (millions) 36.92 58.72
Population aged 65 or older (%) 14.46 3.24
Dependency rate (%) 48.66 5.03
Political Index score (%) 1.144 0.304 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Efficiency with Environment
One of the purposes of welfare investment is to improve national economic growth
using the same resource base. The first procedure to identify the different efficiency
levels of welfare investment is DEA-window analysis with the input-oriented method.
The output variable in the analysis is simply the score of relative efficiency analysis,
or DEA calculated for an OECD country. Instead of using the traditional DEA estima-
tion for the cross-sectional data, the study used window estimation by incorporating all
the inputs from the panel sample. This is because efficiency scores calculated for a
certain time period may not be the same in a different time period. Among the 29
OECD nations, a country with an efficiency score of 1 could be regarded as a best-
practice nation irrespective of different time points. The unadjusted empirical results
show that Korea’s efficiency level is almost 1 across the study periods.
The efficiency scores from an analysis using the original DEA-window method are
unlikely to be genuine, unless the influence of the country’s environmental factors on
the scores is taken into account (Ray, 1991; Ruggiero, 1996). Country-level efforts to
invest in a certain field of welfare and economic development always operate under
different conditions. The link between welfare investment and economic growth
investment in an advanced nation may not always be coordinative, because quite different
environmental factors, or fixed factors, exist (Ray, 1991). If the seemingly conflicting
goals from the two different investments in a nation are not balanced, a proper mix of
welfare growth and economic growth cannot be achieved for the country.
A Tobit panel regression of 29 OECD member countries for three years provides
evidence that country-specific investment conditions make each efficiency score
different. The use of the panel regression method helps find what could be the main
factors in the different efficient groups. The dependent variable in this analysis is simply
the efficiency scores from DEA-window measurement calculated for each country.
Since the efficiency scores range from 0 to 100, Tobit regression is employed with the
censored data.
The analysis shows that the influence of more than four fixed predictor variables
is statistically significant (p < 0.1 or less) and substantively strong in the expected
direction. In the SEG model, a Political Index score indicating a favorable political
atmosphere and the size of the total population have a positive effect on the estimation
of GDP. In contrast, the other three variables—HDI score and dependency rate—
clearly are attributed to making GDP smaller.
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The results from the SEG model show that three variables—HDI score, dependency
rate, and Political Index score—have a negative effect, while total population has a
negative effect on growth efficiency. A unit increase in each variable does lead to less
efficient economic growth in OECD countries.
In contrast, in the ESW model, the effects of three variables—HDI score, total popu-
lation, and share of the population aged 65 or older—are consistent due to the coherent
sign of their negative coefficients on the welfare efficiency (see table 2). An increase
in dependency rate and Political Index score (measured value in reverse order) con-
tributes positively to welfare productivity. As compared to the efficiency scores on
GDP, a country’s environment measured by the three factors is negatively associated
with welfare institution growth. Countries characterized by environmental severity are
more likely to have lower efficiency scores in welfare and economic growth, and
therefore it is necessary to further investigate the trend (Beraldo, 2009) of relative effi-
ciency in both ESW and SEG models over time.
An issue with DEA estimates is that an increase or decrease in environmental
favorableness is associated with the output efficiency regarding GDP or reverse unem-
ployment rate, Welfare Institution Generosity Index score, and life expectancy.
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Table 2. Effects of Fixed Variables on Efficiency
Element SEG model ESW model
Efficiency score for reverse unemployment rate, 
Dependent variable Efficiency score for GDP life expectancy, and Welfare Institution 
Generosity Index score
Independent variable
Human Development Index score -0.5067692*** -0.3328505 (*)(0.0797264) (0.1772583)
Total population -0.0015302*** 0.0006318***(0.0000509) (0.0001099)
Population aged 65 or older -0.0198271*** -0.0002742(0.0009129) (0.0019503)
Dependency rate 0.0014863* -0.0080608**(0.0007114) (0.0013905)
Political Index score -0.0258162* 0.1060204***(0.0108451) (0.0322079)
Intercept 1.14566*** 1.377526***(0.075643) (0.147027)
Probability > Chi2 0.000*** 0.000***
Log likelihood 56.01 91.07
N 87 87
Note: SEG = Stable Economic Growth model; ESW = Efficient Social Welfare model; Tobit Panel Regression (STATA 9.0).
According to Jahanshahloo, Lotfi, Shoja, and Abri (2010), whereas Ray’s (1991) tech-
nical efficiency computation to cure the fixed effects is very useful, research analysis
is explicitly dependent on the re-use of the DEA model with the environmental harsh-
ness variable. They suggest that a true efficiency measure could begin by building a
comprehensive model of a decision-making unit with a complex environment.
By re-employing the methods of Jahanshahloo et al. (2010) and Ray (1991), the
overall Environmental Severity Index is constructed as follows in this study. The
analysis begins with the construction of the Environmental Severity Index by comput-
ing a predicted regression coefficient and residual for each predictor variable. Conse-
quently, the adjusted hat value equals unadjusted hat plus maximum residual value
(0.2101914—Ray, 1991). By purposely setting the maximum efficiency score for each
nation in a given time period to 1, the adjusted efficiency values are finally computed.
The research formulates a more complex approach to inefficiency in providing
welfare and economic investments. The difference between the actual efficiency score
and the adjusted score in the two models is driven by the change in environmental
harshness and strategy for each country. If the inefficiency score is high and increases,
the national investment in welfare and the economy need to be limited in the future.
The inefficiency gap, or change in inefficiency score from period 1 (2003-2005) to
period 2 (2005-2007), is computed in an attempt at comparison. Based on the gap, an
OECD member country may make strategic decisions to efficiently promote welfare
growth and economic growth. If the current inefficiency for welfare growth is higher
than the one for economic growth, it is apparent that the country has been experienc-
ing some waste and obstacles to welfare growth.
A country’s efficiency scores relative to those of other countries in the two periods
are compared to identify the efficiency change. Previously shown in terms of technical
investment efficiency, Korea’s DEA score is almost 1 in both models. This score is
very high, as compared to the other 28 OECD member countries.
However, the trend of the inefficiency scores varies between periods 1 and 2. The
implications for DEA inefficiency scores over the two time periods are that inefficient
investment in either welfare or economy is assumed as a failure in maximizing the
inputs of a country. The results shown in table 3 below indicate that, since 24 OECD
countries out of 29 experienced a decrease in inefficiency in economic investment
(SEG model), they are less likely to waste their resources for national development. In
contrast, 13 out of the 29 countries, including Korea, measured in the ESW model
experienced a deterioration in efficiency (or increase in inefficiency) of welfare
growth. As compared to other nations, the inefficiency of social investment in Korea
was relatively high at the aggregate level of investment during the two different periods.
The trend of DEA inefficiency scores provides a valuable insight for the Korean
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Table 3. Changes in Inefficiency
Inefficiency in ESW model Inefficiency in SEG model
Country Period 1 Period 2 Difference Period 1 Period 2 Difference(2003-2005) (2005-2007) (2003-2005) (2005-2007)
Austria 2.63% 0.46% -2.16% -1.46% -1.93% -0.47%
Belgium -0.14% 0.46% 0.60% 0.58% -1.76% -2.34%
Canada 0.20% -1.91% -2.10% -5.58% -2.05% 3.53%
Czech Republic 1.90% -0.50% -2.40% 5.01% -1.84% -6.84%
Denmark 0.70% -3.10% -3.80% -1.85% -2.52% -0.67%
Finland 1.90% -0.14% -2.04% 1.15% -3.30% -4.45%
France -2.27% 0.07% 2.34% -1.25% -0.15% 1.09%
Germany -4.18% -0.22% 3.95% 1.40% 2.58% 1.18%
Greece 6.70% 4.44% -2.26% 1.61% -1.61% -3.22%
Hungary -0.10% 0.20% 0.30% 8.07% 1.25% -6.82%
Iceland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 19.74% -0.40% -20.14%
Ireland 7.20% 4.60% -2.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Israel 1.90% -1.20% -3.10% -7.57% -1.88% 5.69%
Italy -3.75% 0.09% 3.84% 1.33% 1.00% -0.32%
Japan -4.83% -4.60% 0.22% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Korea 1.80% 2.53% 0.73% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Mexico 1.60% -0.10% -1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Netherlands 0.80% -0.40% -1.20% 10.74% 0.63% -10.11%
New Zealand 0.00% 3.74% 3.74% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Norway 2.90% 0.50% -2.40% 3.68% -1.36% -5.04%
Poland -0.20% 0.60% 0.80% 1.75% 1.52% -0.23%
Portugal 8.00% 1.90% -6.10% 3.30% -0.17% -3.46%
Slovakia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.86% -0.86% -1.72%
Slovenia 0.10% 2.50% 2.40% 1.71% -1.43% -3.14%
Spain -0.28% -0.79% -0.51% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Sweden 0.14% 0.07% -0.07% 0.17% -3.58% -3.75%
Switzerland -1.13% -0.86% 0.27% 1.09% -7.52% -8.61%
United Kingdom -1.34% -0.62% 0.72% 1.97% -1.97% -3.94%
United States -2.77% -0.39% 2.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Average 0.60% 0.25% -0.35% 1.60% -0.94% -2.54%
Inefficiency increase (number) 15 14 13 17 6 5
Note: Positive numbers represent an increase in inefficiency; negative numbers represent a decrease in inefficiency.
government. While Korea experienced no efficiency loss in economic investment, it
experienced a productivity loss in welfare spending in periods 1 and 2. However, its
inefficiency gap in the two periods widened from 1.80 percent to 2.53 percent, show-
ing a 0.73 percent rise in inefficiency in welfare productivity measured for welfare
institutions and outcomes.
Welfare State Type and Efficiency
The relative efficiency of welfare state types is of particular interest in ascertaining
the ideal level of welfare investment. It is necessary to discover the best way to invest
welfare spending or the type of welfare regime that is most conducive to productivity
enhancement for most advanced countries. It is difficult not only to identify the effects
of a country’s decisions on welfare growth and economic growth but also to isolate
which elements of the severe environment have an effect on that growth. In addition,
special attention needs to be paid to performance outcomes that can be distinguished
within either the different welfare regime types or relative efficiency levels or both.
To this end, Cluster Analysis with DEA inefficiency scores can be used to make
clear whether a type of welfare regime matches with a group of efficient or inefficient
countries. If calculated inefficiency scores may be associated with the regime type, a
nation that does not achieve higher welfare investment should reconsider its invest-
ment productivity and should tightly manage the associated resources and factors.
Consequently, the constructed method set up for the balance between welfare and
economic growth.
The findings from the Cluster Analysis show that OECD member countries can be
categorized into three different groups in alignment with their trends in welfare ineffi-
ciency and growth inefficiency. The procedure is the means of confirming whether or
not Decision-Making Units’ welfare resources were used in the most efficient way
during the time periods. The Cluster Analysis focuses on the change patterns of ineffi-
cient investment in welfare and economic growth, since the type of regime has some
degree of path-dependency for the investment (Nadin & Stead, 2008).
Findings from the two different model analyses indicate that the inefficiency
decrease for most OECD countries (group 3 in table 4) does not have much variation.
The measures for inefficiency change seem to cluster more around groups with vary-
ing degrees of inefficiency. Contrary to findings for group 3, 18 countries experienced
increased inefficiency during the two periods (groups 1 and 2). Among them, 15 coun-
tries were not able to reduce welfare inefficiency in the ESW model (group 2). The
deterioration of welfare efficiency and economic growth efficiency was greater in
Korea than in the other nations.
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The Conservative welfare states and a similar type of welfare states such as Portu-
gal, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Iceland show poor efficiency in wel-
fare investment. Portugal, Greece (Pierson & Castles, 2006), Mexico (Tomoko, 2004),
and Finland are more likely to be classified as Conservative-Corporative welfare
states. Even though Korea and other East Asian nations are classified as Confucian
welfare state regimes (Jones, 1993), they are akin to Corporative welfare states (Bam-
bra, 2007). In addition, welfare efficiency is deteriorating in Austria, Norway, and the
Netherlands, which are considered Social Democratic welfare states. One should bear
in mind that a maximized level of governmental investment and consumption may not
guarantee a sustainably higher level of welfare and growth (Rahn & Fox, 1996).
These findings also suggest that liberal welfare regimes, characterized by minimal
governmental intervention, generally attained a higher level of efficiency in the two
models across both time periods. While liberal welfare government intervention in
welfare growth is very weak, its role and accountability in making welfare invest-
ments is not reduced to a minimum. Thus, the Korea government needs to adopt a
strategy for lessening welfare investment inefficiency like the liberal welfare regimes
did, while expanding welfare expenditure to achieve a genuine welfare state.
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Table 4. Trends in Inefficiency
Category Increased inefficiency* Decreased inefficiency*
Welfare inefficiency Moderate (0.23%) Severe (3.62%) (-0.76%)(ESW model)
Economic growth inefficiency Severe (12.85%) Moderate (0.67%) (-0.74%)(SEG model)
Classification Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Hungary (P1; U) Ireland (L) Remaining OECD countries
Iceland (P1; U) New Zealand (P2; L)








Czech Republic (P1; U)
Number of countries 3 15 40
P1 = period 1 (2003-2005); P2 = period 2 (2005-2007).
L = Liberal; C = Conservative; S = Social Democratic; U = unclassified.
* Percentage scores in parentheses are inefficiency scores for a group center.
CONCLUSION AND DICUSSION
This study examined the efficiency of welfare and economic spending over time.
Several important points are worth discussing for Korea as it tries to establish a sus-
tainable welfare state. The trend of change in environmental factors for social welfare
and economic growth should not be overlooked in a country’s decision-making on
improving economic and welfare performance. In consideration of the appropriate
relationship between social welfare and economic growth, this paper articulates two
sets of theories of fundamental efficiency: the Stable Economic Growth model and the
Efficient Social Welfare model. The difference between this study and previous studies
is that the efficiency calculation and overall inefficiency estimation are based on these
two models.
With these models, welfare spending is investigated as to whether the investment
adversely affects productivity in both the economy and welfare at the same time. The
key assumption in this research is that efficient investment in welfare and growth for
OECD countries should be estimated with nondiscretionary variables. One of the most
overlooked points of international comparison in the efficiency measurement literature
for social welfare is the degree of environmental factors that disturb efficiency changes
between welfare-prioritized countries and economic-growth-prioritized countries.
Different statistical methods and designs for analyzing social welfare and economic
growth are considered to prove variations in efficiency outcomes. The trend of efficiency
scores is explained based on countries’ decision-making on welfare growth.
The results of this study apparently show that the overall efficiency of welfare
investment is relatively low, as compared to a high efficiency level in economic
growth for OECD member countries overall. The efficiency gain from economic
growth in the SEG model is the most recognized pattern for most OECD nations. The
high social welfare inefficiency found for many countries in the ESW model could be
eliminated in various ways.
In spite of the variation in inefficiency in each nation’s welfare spending, this study
found a welfare spending pattern. Korea’s welfare expenditure became more ineffi-
cient from 2003 to 2007. This finding indicates that investment in welfare and eco-
nomic growth for Korea was not quite successful.
The study also found that differences in welfare regime type contribute to differ-
ences in efficiency in economic and welfare investment. Corporative welfare states
and Social Democratic welfare states considered in this study generally have low welfare
efficiency. This finding suggests that the decision to promote welfare growth by the
Korean government should be considered both without increasing investment ineffi-
ciency and without creating conflicts between welfare and economic growth, which
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could not be completely resolved.
Based on what we have learned from the previous experiences of Liberal welfare
states through international efficiency comparison, balancing welfare and economic
growth could be a very challenging task for Korea. The lack of an effective govern-
mental decision mechanism, under pressure to establish an appropriate mix of welfare
and economic growth, creates uncertainties. This paper suggests that efficiency loss in
welfare investment could be an even bigger problem than productivity gain. Therefore,
it concludes that the goals of welfare and economic growth are likely to be achieved
efficiently if the inefficiency problem affected by uncontrollable factors in welfare
investment is solved.
REFERENCES
Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L., & Tanzi, V. 2003. Public sector efficiency: An interna-
tional comparison. Public Choice, 123(3-4): 321-347.
Aiginger, K., & Guger, A. 2006. The ability to adapt: Why it differs between the Scan-
dinavian and continental European models. Intereconomics, 14(1): 14-23.
Atkinson, A. B. 1995. Is the welfare state necessarily an obstacle to economic growth?
European Economic Review, 39: 723-730.
Atkinson, A. B. 1999. The economic consequences of rolling back the welfare state.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Atkinson, A., & Werner-Sinn, H. 1999. The economic consequences of rolling back
the welfare state. CES Munich Lectures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Baumol, W. 1984. Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: What the long run
data show. American Economic Review, 76: 1072-1085.
Beraldo, S., Montolio, D., & Turati, G. 2005. Healthy, educated and wealthy: Is the
welfare state really harmful for growth? Working Paper No. 127, Universitat de
Barcelona.
Bergh, A. 2006. Work incentives and employment are the wrong explanation of
Sweden’s success. Economic Journal Watch, 3(3): 452-460.
Brooks, C., & Manza, J. 2006. Why do welfare states persist? Journal of Politics,
68(4): 816-827.
Caruana, C. 2010. Measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the welfare state: A
comparative study of the EU-27 member states. Bank of Valletta Review,
42(Autumn): 75-106.
Esping-Andersen, G. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Cambridge: Polity
Press.
144 The Efficiency in Welfare Expenditure and Economic Growth
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Farrell, M. 1957. The measurement of productive efficiency. Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, Series A, 120(3): 253-290.
Fic, T., & Ghate, C. 2005. The welfare state, thresholds, and economic growth. Economic
Modelling, 22: 571-598.
Ghate, C., & Zak, P. 2002. The growth of government and the politics of fiscal policy.
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 13: 435-455.
Gouyette, C., & Pestieau, P. 1999. Efficiency of the welfare state. Kyklos, 52(4): 537-553.
Gupta, S., & Verhoeven, M. 2001. The efficiency of government expenditure-experiences
from Africa. Journal of Policy Modelling, 23: 433-467.
Hansson, P., & Henrekson, M. 1994. A new framework for testing the effect of govern-
ment spending on growth and productivity. Public Choice, 81(3-4): 381-401.
Hemerijck, A., & Eichhorst, W. 2009. Whatever happened to the Bismarckian welfare
state?: From labor shedding to employment-friendly reforms. In B. Palier (ed.),
The politics of welfare reform in continental Europe. Amsterdam: Amsterdam
University Press.
Jahanshahloo, G. R., Lotfi, F. H., Shoja, N., & Abri, A. G. 2010. Proposing a new
model on data envelopment analysis by considering non-discretionary factors
and a review on previous models. Mathematical and Computational Applications,
15(3): 344-353.
Jones, C. 1993. New perspectives on the welfare states in Europe. London: Routledge.
Kahn, G. 1992. Policies for long-run economic growth: A summary of the bank’s 1992
symposium. Kansas City, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Landau, D. 1985. Government expenditure and economic growth in the developed
countries: 1952-1976. Public Choice, 47: 459-477.
Lindbeck, A., Molander, P., Petersson, O., Sandmo, A., et al. 1993. Options for eco-
nomic and political reform in Sweden. Economic Policy, 17: 220-263.
McCallum, J., & Blais, A. 1987. Government, special interest groups and economic
growth. Public Choice, 54: 2-18.
McDonald, B. D., & Miller, D. R. 2009. So long and thanks for all the fish: The
impact of social welfare programs on the state economy. Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
Nadin, V., & Stead, D. 2008. European spatial planning systems, social models and
learning. disP-Planning Review, 44(1): 35-47.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G. 1994. Is inequality harmful for growth? American Economic
Review, 84(3): 600-621.
Pierson, C., & Castles, F. G. 2006. The welfare state reader (2nd ed.). Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Rahn, R., & Fox, H. 1996. What is the optimum size of government? Denver, CO:
The Efficiency in Welfare Expenditure and Economic Growth 145
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Vernon K. Krieble Foundation.
Ravallion, M. 2003. Measuring aggregate welfare in developing countries: How well
do national accounts and surveys agree? Review of Economics and Statistics,
85(3): 645-652.
Ray, S. C. 1991. Resource use efficiency in public schools: A study of Connecticut
data. Management Science, 37: 1620-1628.
Ruggiero, J. 1996. Measuring technical efficiency in the public sector. European Journal
of Operational Research, 90: 553-565.
Tomoko, M. 2004. The foundation of the Mexican welfare state and social security
reform in the 1990s. Developing Economies, 42(2): 262-287.
Weede, E. 1991. The impact of state power on economic growth rates in OECD countries.
Quality and Quantity, 25: 421-438.
146 The Efficiency in Welfare Expenditure and Economic Growth
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
